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A Note on the Computation of the Equity 





Turnovsky (1995) derives in a continuous-time model of a decentralized economy that the 
correct specification of the firm’s objective function is to maximize the initial value of its 
outstanding securities. The firm value is the discounted flow of real earnings. For the discrete-
time version of the model, we show that the correct computation of the firm value needs to be 
modified. Depending on the specific formula employed, different values of the equity 
premium result. 
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are ours. 1 Introduction
Asset pricing in production economies has been extensively studied in the literature,
e.g. in Jerman (1998). In these models, the asset value of the ﬁrm ˜ Vt in period t is
typically computed as the expected discounted sum of future cash ﬂows:1







where β, λt, and CFt denote the discount factor of the household, the marginal utility
of consumption, and the cash ﬂow in period t. The operator E0 denotes mathematical
expectations with respect to information as of period 0.








In the following, we will brieﬂy describe the model of Jermann (1998) that is often used
as a benchmark for the computation of asset prices and solve it for the ﬁrm value.2 In
addition, we show that the value of the equity premium depends on the speciﬁcation
of the ﬁrm value.
2 The Economy
We consider the asset pricing model of Jerman (1998) and follow the description of
this model in Herr and Maußner (2009). The set-up is the standard real business cycle
model with a household and production sector. Productivity is subject to a random
shock. There is a single good that is used in investment and consumption. Time is
discrete and denoted by t.
1For example, see equation (2.1) of Jermann (1998).
2We could have also derived these results in a much simpler version of a production economy
without habit formation and adjustment cost of capital. We, however, have chosen the more complex
model as it features so prominently in the asset pricing literature, e.g. in Boldrin et al. (2001) or
Lettau and Uhlig (2000).
12.1 Households
A representative household supplies labor in a ﬁxed amount of N = 1 at the real wage
wt. Besides labor income he receives dividends dt per unit of share St he holds of the
representative ﬁrm. The current price of shares in units of the consumption good is vt.
His current period utility function u(.) depends on current and past consumption, Ct







(Ct+s   bCt+s−1)1−   1
1   η
}
, η  0, β 2 (0,1)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
vt(St+1   St)  wt + dtSt   Ct. (2.1)
The ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem are:
λt = (Ct   bCt−1)
−   βbEt(Ct+1   bCt)
−, (2.2a)





where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint and Rt denotes the current
period gross return on equity.
2.2 Firms
The representative ﬁrm uses labor Nt and capital Kt to produce output Yt according





t , α 2 (0,1). (2.3)
The level of total factor productivity Zt is governed by the AR(1)-Process
lnZt = ρ










The ﬁrm ﬁnances part of its investment It from retained earnings REt and issues new
shares to cover the remaining part:
It = vt(St+1   St) + REt. (2.5)
2It distributes the excess of its proﬁts over retained earnings to the household sector:
dtSt = Yt   wtNt   REt. (2.6)
Investment increases the ﬁrm’s future stock of capital according to:
Kt+1 = Φ(It/Kt)Kt + (1   δ)Kt, δ 2 [0,1], (2.7)
where δ denotes the rate of depreciation and adjustment costs Φ(.) are a positive
concave function.
2.3 Computation of the Firm Value
To derive the objective function of the ﬁrm, we follow Turnovsky (1995). Let Vt+1
denote the value of the shares at the end of period t, Vt+1 = vtSt+1. From (2.5), (2.6),
and (2.2c), we get





= RtVt   CFt,









2.4 Optimality Conditions of the Firm
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize V0 given in (2.8) subject to the constraint (2.7).
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm are:3

















t+1   (It+1/Kt+1) + qt+1
[




3Note that the same set of conditions derives from maximizing (1.1).





qtKt+1 = 0 (2.9d)
must hold.
3 Computation of the Asset Prices
In order to illustrate the implications of the ﬁrm value speciﬁcation for asset pricing, we
consider a numerical example. We will ﬁrst describe our calibration procedure before
we present our details for the computation of the equity premium.
3.1 Calibration








+ a2, ζ > 0. (3.1)
The choice of the parameters a1 and a2 is described in the Appendix. For the remaining
parameters, we use values that are standard in the literature. In particular, we follow
Heer and Maußner (2009), Section 6.3.4. Table 3.1 displays the respective values. The




Preferences β=0.994 b=0.8 η=2
Production α=0.27 δ=0.011 ρZ=0.90 σZ=0.0072
ζ=1/0.23
The solution of the model are functions gi, i 2 fK,Y,C,I,λ,qg, that determine Kt+1,
Yt, Ct, It, λt, and qt given the current period state variables Kt, Ct−1, and the log of the
productivity shock lnZt. We use the quadratic approximation of g at the stationary
equilibrium which is derived in the Appendix.4
4The source code is available in the Fortran program Model Equity 2.for and can be downloaded
from Alfred Maußner’s homepage ’http://www.wiwi.uni-augsburg.de/vwl/maussner/’.
43.2 Asset Price Implications
In the following, we derive the risk-free rate of return and three diﬀerent expressions
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e3
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We use the Gauss-Hermite 6-point quadrature formula to approximate the integral on
the right-hand-side of this equation.
The labor market equilibrium condition (2.9a) and equation (2.7) imply that the right-

















where the second equality follows from equations (2.5) and (2.6) and the observation
that qtKt+1 = vtSt+1 (see Heer and Maußner (2009), p. 317). Therefore, the gross rate




αYt+1   It+1 + qt+1Kt+2
qtKt+1
. (3.2)
Alternatively, we can use the value of the ﬁrm as computed by (1.1) and (1.2), respec-
tively, in order to derive an expression for the return on equity. For this reason, we

















t+1   rt 4.00%
R
e2
t+1   rt 3.86%
R
e3
t+1   rt 3.94%
We use a random number generator to compute a long artiﬁcial time series for R
ei
t+1 rt,
i = 1,2,3. The averages of these time series are our measures of the ex-post equity
premium implied by the model. For a time series of 1,000,000 observations and the
parameters from Table 3.1, the results are summarized in 3.2. We ﬁnd an average
annual risk-free rate of about 2.4% percent and an equity premium of 4.00%, 3.86%,
and 3.94% for the three diﬀerent computations considered in (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4),
respectively.6
4 Conclusion
In this note, we show that the correct ﬁrm value is given by (1.2) rather than (1.1).
The equity premium that result from the model of the production economy depends
on this speciﬁcation. For our parametric example, we ﬁnd equity premia in the range
of 3.86% to 4.00%.
5Note, Yt+1 = Yt+1   wt+1Nt+1.
6In particular, we used the same sequence of shocks and, therefore, the same sequence of state
variables for the computation of the three diﬀerent formulas of the equity premium.
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5 Appendix: Deterministic Stationary Equilibrium
Our solution strategy rests on a second-order approximation of the model. Therefore,
we must consider the stationary equilibrium of the deterministic counterpart of our
model. To this end, we set σZ = 0 so that Zt equals its unconditional expectation
Z = 1 for all t. Stationarity implies xt+1 = xt = x for any variable xt in our model. As
usual, we specify Φ so that adjustment costs play no role in the stationary equilibrium,







These assumptions imply the stationary solution for the stock of capital:
K =
(





Output, investment, consumption, and the stationary solution for λ are then given by
Y = K
, (5.1b)
I = δK, (5.1c)
C = Y   I, (5.1d)
7λ = C
−(1   b)
−(1   bβ). (5.1e)
In order to determine the ﬁrm’s value, we use a recursive formulation of (1.1) and (1.2),
respectively. In particular, (1.1) gives rise to
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